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The use of drug-detection dogs by law enforcement has become one of the
focal points in government efforts to enforce drug laws. In particular, courts
have scrutinized the use of drug-detection dogs during traffic stops under the
Fourth Amendment.' Until very recently however, courts were unclear
whether the Fourth Amendment permitted police to use a drug-detection dog
to sniff the exterior of a vehicle during a lawful, routine traffic stop without
any suspicion of drug-related activity. In January 2005, the U.S. Supreme
Court in Illinois v. Caballesi held that a dog sniff conducted during a lawful,
routine traffic stop that reveals nothing more than the presence or absence of
an illegal substance does not violate the Fourth Amendment.3
This Article discusses the latest trends relating to the use of drug-detection
dogs during routine traffic stops, emphasizing U.S. Supreme Court, Tenth
Circuit, and Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals cases. Part II discusses
general Supreme Court cases involving drug-detection dogs and police
encounters with private citizens, and lays the foundation for a more specific
discussion of the use of drug-detection dogs during routine traffic stops in Part
LII. Part III outlines the most prevalent Fourth Amendment analysis used by
courts examining the use of drug-detection dogs at traffic stops. Finally, Part
IV examines Caballes and the Supreme Court's analysis of whether reasonable
suspicion is required to conduct a dog sniff of a vehicle during a routine traffic
stop.
© 2005 Michael J. Fields.
* Assistant District Attorney, Enid, Oklahoma. B.A., University of Oklahoma, 1994;
J.D., University of Oklahoma, 1997.
1. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV. For an analysis of how the Fourth Amendment applies to the use of
drug-detection dogs, see United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983).
2. 125 S. Ct. 834 (2005).
3. Id. at 838.
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II. Background
In United States v. Place,4 the U.S. Supreme Court established the analytical
framework for subsequent drug-detection dog cases. In Place, law
enforcement officers became suspicious of the defendant as he waited in line
at an airport to purchase a ticket to New York City.5 Officers asked the
defendant for permission to search his checked bags.6 Although Place
consented, the officers did not have time to search the bags and allowed the
defendant to board the plane.7 After discovering discrepancies in the
defendant's luggage tags, however, the officers alerted Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) authorities in New York City.
8
When Place arrived in New York, DEA agents told him that they suspected
he was transporting illegal drugs.9 After the defendant refused to consent to
a search, the agents seized his luggage and subjected it to a "sniff test" by a
drug-detection dog. 0 The dog reacted positively to a suitcase, and the agents
used this information to obtain a search warrant." Using the warrant, the
agents ultimately found cocaine in Place's luggage.12 Place pleaded guilty to
the charge of possessing cocaine with the intent to distribute, but reserved the
right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress the contents of
his suitcase. 3
Although the Supreme Court held that the seizure of the defendant's
luggage violated the Fourth Amendment, the Court maintained that subjecting
the bag to a "sniff test" by a drug-detection dog did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 4 The Court noted that the sniff
was less invasive and more discerning than a typical search because it
disclosed "only the presence or absence" of contraband." Indeed, the Court
stated that it was not aware of any other investigative technique that was "so
limited both in the manner in which the information is obtained and in the
4. 462 U.S. 696 (1983).








13. Id. at 700.
14. Id. at 707.
15. Id. Specifically, the sniff allowed the luggage to remain closed so that noncontraband




content of the information revealed by the procedure."' 6 Therefore, the Court
concluded that a dog sniff did not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
7
In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court used Place's rationale to examine
the use of drug-detection dogs to sniff vehicles. In City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond,1 8 the Court noted that sniffing the exterior of an automobile does not
require entry, nor does it reveal the presence or absence of anything but
contraband.' 9 The Court also again noted that a dog sniff is much less
intrusive than a typical search.2"
Following the Supreme Court, both the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals have similarly held that
dog sniffs are not searches. 2' These courts have also held that a positive
indication for the presence of illegal drugs by a drug-detection dog justifies a
warrantless search of a vehicle.22
Ilf. Fourth Amendment Analysis of Cases Involving Drug-Detection Dogs
at Traffic Stops
In analyzing Fourth Amendment issues associated with the use of drug-
detection dogs at traffic stops, courts have applied a fairly consistent analysis.
Courts will first classify the police-citizen encounter as (1) a consensual
encounter, (2) an investigative detention, or (3) an arrest. Because police
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. 531 U.S. 32 (2000). In Edmond, police established a drug interdiction checkpoint and
required vehicles traveling through the checkpoint to submit to a canine sniff. Id. at 35. The
Court held that although a dog sniff did not transform the checkpoint seizure into a search, the
checkpoint itself was a violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 40.
19. Id.
20. Id. (citing United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 707 (1983)).
21. In Scott v. State, 1996 OK CR 57, 927 P.2d 1066, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals held that "[i]t is not disputed that a canine sniff of luggage in custody of a common
carrier without reasonable suspicion does not constitute a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment." Id. 8,927 P.2d at 1068. Likewise, in United States v. Morales-Zamora,
914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990), the Tenth Circuit held in a case involving an alert on a vehicle
by a drug-detection dog at a police checkpoint that when an intrusion is solely limited to
revealing the presence or absence of contraband, there is no search and hence no Fourth
Amendment violation. Id. at 203.
22. For example, in State v. Paul, 2003 OK CR 1, 62 P.3d 389, the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals held that "a dog sniff 'hit' creates probable cause to search without a
warrant." Id. 3, 62 P.3d at 390. Similarly, in the case of United States v. $189,825.00, 8 F.
Supp. 2d 1300 (N.D. Okla. 1998), the District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma held
that a positive alert from a trained drug-detection dog alone provides law enforcement officers
with probable cause to search a vehicle for drugs. Id. at 1311.
2004]
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officers predominately use drug-detection dogs before an arrest as a way to
investigate or confirm suspicions of drug-related criminal activity, the use of
dog sniffs is more common in consensual encounters and investigative
detentions.
A. Consensual Encounters
Courts have generally characterized consensual encounters as contacts
between citizens and law enforcement officers in which the citizen is free to
leave and may refuse to answer questions posed by the officer.23 Thus, police
officers do not violate the Fourth Amendment simply by approaching someone
in a public place and asking if he is willing to answer some questions.24
Likewise, any voluntary responses to such questions may be admitted into
evidence without objection.
During consensual encounters, police officers may request consent to
search.6  Permission to search may include consent to a dog sniff. For
example, in United States v. Chavira,27 the Tenth Circuit upheld the legality
of a dog sniff performed on a lawfully detained vehicle pursuant to the driver's
voluntary consent to the sniff.28 Although the Supreme Court has not yet
specifically resolved this issue, courts are likely to follow Chavira, especially
given Florida v. Royer,29 in which the Supreme Court held that police are free
to approach individuals and engage them in voluntary conversation without
effecting a seizure.
B. Investigative Detentions
If the court determines that the sniff occurred during an investigative
detention, the court will examine whether the detention itself is valid.30 Courts
have routinely held that law enforcement officers have the right to detain
individuals on less than probable cause if there is a "reasonable suspicion of
23. See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983) (holding that without giving any
justifying reasons, police are free to approach individuals in public places and engage them in
voluntary conversation without effecting a seizure); DeVooght v. State, 1986 OK CR 100, 7,
722 P.2d 705,708 (holding that when a person voluntarily cooperates with the police and is free
to leave, there is no arrest).
24. United States v. Chavira, 9 F.3d 888, 889 (10th Cir. 1993).
25. Id.
26. See, e.g., Florida v. Bostic, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).
27. 9 F.3d 888 (10th Cir. 1993).
28. Id. at 889-90.
29. 460 U.S. 491 (1983).
30. Courts will analyze the detention and not the sniff because the Supreme Court has
already determined that canine sniffs are not searches under the Fourth Amendment. See United




criminal activity derived from 'specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion. ... ,,,3 ' The Supreme Court has also held that a brief detention is
justified for a routine traffic stop.32
Once police have detained a vehicle for a traffic violation, the police officer
may order the driver and passengers out of the vehicle, and ask them about
their travel plans, occupations, and relationship to each other, even in the
absence of reasonable suspicion of other criminal conduct. 33  In such
situations, courts have routinely held that if the scope and duration of the
detention are reasonable under the circumstances, police may use drug-
detection dogs to confirm or dispel suspicion of drug-related criminal
activity.
34
IV. Is a Reasonable Suspicion of Drug Activity Required Before Requesting
or Conducting a Canine Sniff of a Vehicle?
While the law is well settled that a dog sniff is justified during investigative
stops based on a reasonable suspicion that the person being detained is
involved in criminal drug activity, the expanded use of dog sniffs in situations
unrelated to drug activity was less clear until the Supreme Court's recent
decision in Illinois v. Caballes. Although the Tenth Circuit had ruled on the
issue, other circuit and state courts either had not ruled or had ruled in direct
contrast to the Tenth Circuit's opinion.
The Tenth Circuit first ruled on the issue in the case of United States v.
Morales-Zamora.35 The Morales-Zamora court combined two cases involving
the same New Mexico police department. In one case, defendant Morales-
Zamora was traveling on the interstate when police officers stopped her at a
roadblock.36 The stated purpose of the roadblock was "to check for drivers'
31. United States v. Sandoval, 29 F.3d 537, 539 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1968)); see also Knighton v. State, 1996 OK CR 2, 1 22,912 P.2d 878, 886
(holding that an officer who stops and briefly detains a person "must be able to point to specific
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences therefrom" create a
reasonable suspicion that the person detained is or was engaged in criminal activity).
32. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996) ("As a general matter, the decision
to stop an automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to believe that a traffic
violation has occurred.").
33. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 415 (1997); United States v. Galindo-
Gonzalez, 142 F.3d 1217, 1221 (10th Cir. 1998).
34. See, e.g., Place, 462 U.S. at 696; United States v. $189,825.00, 8 F. Supp. 2d 1300,
1310 (N.D. Okla. 1998).
35. 914 F.2d 200 (10th Cir. 1990).
36. Id. at 201.
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licenses, vehicle registrations, and proofs of insurance. '37 While one officer
checked Morales-Zamora's documents, another walked a drug dog around the
exterior of her car.38 Before the officers completed the document check, the
dog alerted them to something in the car. A subsequent search revealed 126
pounds of marijuana in the trunk.39
In the other case, defendant Ozuna-Fuentes was driving a van on the same
interstate and also encountered a roadblock.4° Again, while police checked
Ozuna-Fuentes's documents, a drug dog signaled the police to something in
the van. 4' A search revealed thirty pounds of marijuana concealed under the
van's chassis.42
Both defendants moved to suppress the evidence of contraband seized at the
roadblock; the courts in both cases sustained the motions.43 The government
took an interlocutory appeal of the two district court rulings, and the Tenth
Circuit consolidated the cases on appeal.'
The Tenth Circuit began its analysis by examining the propriety of the
initial detentions at the roadblocks.45 In holding that the detentions at the
roadblock were lawful, the court stated that as long as the roadblock was
established "for the valid purpose of checking drivers' licenses, vehicle
registrations, and proofs of insurance.... detention at the roadblock was not
an unreasonable seizure under the fourth amendment."'
Next, the court addressed whether defendants' continuing detention to
facilitate the dog sniff was also lawful.47 In ruling on this aspect of the case,
the court looked closely at the sequence of events at the roadblock.48 The
court noted that the drug-detection dogs alerted on the vehicles before officers
had finished checking the defendants' documents. 49 Because the defendants
were not detained any longer than necessary to effectuate the initial reason for
the stop, the court held that officers had not unlawfully seized the vehicles for






42. Id. at 201-02.
43. Id. at 202.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 202-03.








The court then considered the specific question raised on appeal of "whether
the police must have a reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity"
to initiate a dog sniff on a lawfully detained vehicle."' Using the same
justifications set forth in Place,52 the court reasoned that the dog sniff at the
roadblock was not a search under the Fourth Amendment. 53 After noting that
there is no intrusion on legitimate privacy interests when the only confidential
information is the presence or absence of contraband,' the court held that
"individualized reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity is not
required when the dog sniff is employed during a lawful seizure of the
vehicle. 5
The Supreme Court ruled consistently with Morales-Zamora in Illinois v.
Caballes and used a similar analysis in reaching its conclusion. In Caballes,
an Illinois state trooper stopped Caballes for speeding on an interstate
highway.56 When the trooper radioed the dispatcher to report the stop, another
trooper overheard the transmission and immediately went to the scene of the
traffic stop with his drug-detection dog.57 While the first trooper wrote the
respondent a warning ticket, the second trooper walked the drug-detection dog
51. Id.
52. Id. The court specifically noted that the sniff took place in public and was limited to
the exterior of the vehicle so that it did not invade the defendants' privacy or subject them to
any embarrassment, inconvenience, or even delay. Id.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109 (1984); United States v. Place, 462
U.S. 696 (1983); Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d at 205 (citing United States v. Colyer, 878 F.2d
469, 474 (D.C. Cir. 1989) ("Place and Jacobsen stand for the proposition that a possessor of
contraband can maintain no legitimate expectation that its presence will not be revealed.")); see
also United States v. Goldstein, 635 F.2d 356, 361 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that "reasonable
expectation of privacy does not extend to airspace surrounding ... luggage").
55. Morales-Zamora, 914 F.2d at 203. In contrast to the Tenth Circuit's opinion in
Morales-Zamora, a handful of state court decisions have held that police officers must have
reasonable suspicion of drug-related criminal activity before they can use a drug-detection dog
in a routine traffic stop. For example, in the Wyoming case of Damato v. State, 64 P.3d 700
(Wyo. 2003), the Wyoming Supreme Court held that the officer did not have reasonable
suspicion to call for the drug dog when he pulled over a driver for going two miles an hour over
the speed limit. Id. at 710. In 2002, the Illinois Supreme Court similarly held that a police
officer making a routine traffic stop must have further justification to call for a drug-detection
dog. People v. Cox, 782 N.E.2d 275 (Ill. 2002). The Cox court opined that, if it permitted
officers to conduct dog sniffs immediately upon making a traffic stop, it would effectively "be
endorsing a drug-sniff test at every stop for a traffic violation." Id. at 280-81. Finally, the
Minnesota Supreme Court also found that officers must have an articulable suspicion of drug-
related activity to conduct a dog sniff after a routine traffic stop. Minnesota v. Wiegand, 645
N4.W.2d 125, 137 (Minn. 2002).
56. Illinois v. Caballes, 125 S. Ct. 834, 836 (2005).
57. Id.
2004]
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around the vehicle.18 The dog alerted on the vehicle's trunk.5 9 Based on this
alert, the officers searched the vehicle and found marijuana inside the trunk.6°
The entire stop lasted less than ten minutes.6'
Caballes was convicted of a drug offense and sentenced to twelve years in
prison.62 The trial judge denied a motion to suppress, holding that the officers
had not unnecessarily prolonged the stop and that the dog alert provided
probable cause to conduct the search.63 The state appellate court affirmed this
decision, but the Illinois Supreme Court reversed on the grounds that the use
of the drug-detection dog unjustifiably enlarged the scope of a routine traffic
stop into a drug investigation.64 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari on
the question of "whether the Fourth Amendment requires reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify using a drug-detection dog to sniff a vehicle
during a legitimate traffic stop.
65
In a 6-2 decision,6 the Supreme Court reasoned that because "[o]fficial
conduct that does not 'compromise any legitimate interest in privacy' is not a
search subject to the Fourth Amendment," there can be no legitimate
expectation of privacy in the possession of contraband.67 Because drug-
detection dog sniffs are designed to reveal only the presence or absence of
contraband, "[a] dog sniff conducted during a. . . lawful traffic stop that
reveals no information other than the location of a substance that no individual
has any right to possess does not violate the Fourth Amendment.,
68
In this holding, the Caballes Court made three important assumptions.
First, the Court assumed that the initial traffic stop was legitimate. Had the
stop not been legitimate, the Court noted that any subsequent discovery of
contraband would be the product of an unconstitutional seizure.69 Second, the
Court assumed that the duration of the traffic stop had not been extended to
enable the dog sniff to occur. Had the stop been unreasonably prolonged, any
subsequent discovery of contraband would also be an unconstitutional







64. Id. at 836-37.
65. Id. at 837.
66. Chief Justice Rehnquist took no part in the decision. Id. at 838.
67. Id. at 837 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 123 (1984)).
68. Id. at 838.





sufficiently reliable to establish probable cause to search the trunk, the Court
assumed that the drug-detection dog itself was well-trained and reliable.7'
Caballes therefore suggests that these three conditions must be met to
legitimize a dog sniff during a routine traffic stop.
V. Conclusion
Although courts generally do not consider drug-detection dog sniffs to be
searches, the use of dog sniffs nevertheless raises Fourth Amendment
concerns. To the extent that these sniffs occur during police-citizen
encounters, a Fourth Amendment analysis undoubtedly governs their
constitutionality.
First, courts should examine the nature of the police-citizen encounter
within which the sniff occurs. 72 Any nonconsensual encounter must be
accompanied by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity, if not
probable cause.73 If a dog sniff occurs during a nonconsensual police-citizen
encounter, such encounter may not be unreasonably prolonged to facilitate the
sniff.74 If a detention is unreasonably prolonged to facilitate the sniff, then the
detention, the sniff, and any seizure that may result all violate the Fourth
Amendment.75
Only if a detention is not unreasonably prolonged will courts move to the
second part of the analysis. The second phase depends on whether the dog
alerted. Once the dog alerts, officers have probable cause to search - even
without a warrant.76
The question of whether a canine sniff during a routine traffic stop wholly
unrelated to criminal drug activity violated the Fourth Amendment had been
an unsettled area of the law until Illinois v. Caballes. Thus, Caballes finally
provides a clear analytical framework within which to review subsequent
challenges and issues.
71. Id. at 838.
72. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
73. See United States v. Chavira, 29 F.3d 888 (1993).
74. State v. Paul, 2003 OK CR 1, 62 P.3d 389.
75. See Chavira, 29 F.3d at 888.
76. See Place, 462 U.S. at 696; Paul, 62 P.3d at 389.
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